EthCC[9]
Voting and Vote Splitting in Crypto-economic Systems
Description
We consider how vote splitting between similar options manifests itself with subtle differences in settings such as governance voting in DAOs, voting in Schelling-point oracles such as Kleros and UMA, and choosing a fork in a consensus algorithm.
EthCC[8]
Peer Prediction and Schelling-Point Oracles
Description
The academic field of peer prediction proposes crowdsourcing mechanisms such as extracting “surprisingly popular” answers from expert minorities. We explore adapting such ideas to Schelling Point oracles such as Kleros in an attack resistant fashion.
TE Unplugged – Incentives at the Edge: Valuation and Verification in Crypto Protocols
Description
This TE Unplugged session, led by Kris, is a live roundtable featuring experts on decentralized finance and dispute resolution. We’ll explore fee volatility pricing models and the economics of truth-seeking, highlighting links between data, incentives, and governance.